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ARGUMENT
I.

REPLY TO FIREMAN'S FUND'S ARGUMENT.
A. BIG SKY DID PRESERVE ISSUES FOR APPEAL AGAINST
FIREMAN'S FUND.
Fireman's Fund continues to cling doggedly to the argument that Big Sky has failed to

preserve any issues for appeal with respect to Fireman's Fund because Big Sky did not respond
to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment below, nl This argument completely
ignores the fact that Big Sky's appeal is based largely in part on the trial court's denial of Big
Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend, which had nothing to do with Fireman's Fund's Motion for
Summary Judgment, which was only denied with respect to Lawyers Title (R575-576), and
which had already been denied prior to the time that Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed.
It is undisputed that Big Sky did not file an opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for
Summary Judgment below. However, Big Sky did brief the exact same issues presented by
Fireman's Fund and argue the exact same merits of the issues presented by Fireman's Fund in an
earlier Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lawyers Title. The issues were the same in both
Motions for Summary Judgment, i.e., (1) Whether Big Sky had raised additional causes of action
other than one for fraudulent nondisclosure in the Amended Complaint; and (2) whether Big Sky
should be allowed to amend the Amended Complaint. In the hearing on Lawyers Title's Motion
for Summary Judgment, the parties briefed the Rule 8 notice pleading issues, Big Sky argued that
it had raised additional causes of action other than fraudulent nondisclosure in its Amended

1 This issue has already been briefed once on appeal by Big Sky and Fireman's Fund in the Memoranda relating to
Big Sky's Motion for Summary Disposition.
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Complaint, and the trial court decided that there was only one cause of action, fraudulent
nondisclosure, raised by the Amended Complaint. In the hearing on Lawyers Title's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the parties briefed the Rule 15 amendment issues, Big Sky argued that it
should be allowed to amend the Complaint again, and the trial court determined that Big Sky was
not allowed to amend the Amended Complaint further. Fireman's Fund's subsequent Motion for
Summary Judgment raised the same issue that Lawyers Title had already raised, i.e., that Big
Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure against Fireman's Fund should be dismissed. Based on
the law of the case, any response to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment would
have been futile. In Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984), the
Utah Supreme Court ruled that when the trial court had denied a Motion for Summary Judgment,
that the trial court could not later essentially overrule itself and grant a subsequent Motion for
Summary Judgment, where the issues were the same, the facts were the same, and the only
difference in the two Motions for Summary Judgment was that in the subsequent Motion, more
authority was cited.
Fireman's Fund argues that the trial court acknowledged that Big Sky and Fireman's
Fund would "live to fight another day" after the oral argument on Lawyers Title's Motion for
Summary Judgment. However, pursuant to the law of the case, after reviewing Fireman's Fund's
Motion for Summary Judgment, where the issues were exactly the same, i.e., that (1) Big Sky had
only raised a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure, the trial court could not have made a different
decision with respect to Fireman's Fund's Motion than it did with respect to Lawyers Title's
Motion.
One branch of what is generally termed the doctrine of "law of the case"" has
2

evolved to avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is presented
with an issue identical to one which has already been passed upon by a coordinate
judge in the same case. Ordinarily one judge of the same court cannot properly
overrule the decision of another judge of that court. There are several exceptions
to this rule. However, only one could possibly be applicable here: The second
judge may reverse the first judge's ruling if the issues decided by the first judge
are presented to the second judge in a "different light," as where a summary
judgment initially denied is subsequently granted after additional evidence is
adduced. The issue here is whether the motion before Judge Leary presented the
questions involved in the summary judgment motion in a "different light."
Examination of the record shows that it did not. No discovery took place between
the two hearings on the summary judgment motions. No additional evidence was
introduced. All material facts remained the same. Indeed, a comparison of the
moving papers filed in support of the original motion and the renewed motion
discloses that the only difference between the two was the citation of additional
authorities. In Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1033, the
Court indicated that mere citation of additional authority is insufficient to warrant
one judge's reversal of a coordinate judge's ruling, at least where the cited
authority does not modify the fundamental theory of the motion. Plaintiffs
additional citations did not satisfy this test. Therefore, Judge Leary's grant of
summary judgment was error. We reverse and remand the case for trial without
reaching any other issues raised on appeal.
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984). In this case, much like the
two (2) motions in Sittner, the motions filed by Lawyers Title and Fireman's Fund were
identical, except for the moving parties involved.
Fireman's Fund alleges that this Court should not consider Big Sky's argument because it
is raised for the first time on appeal, and moreover, because Big Sky has not argued that there
were exceptional circumstances that justified Big Sky's failure to oppose Fireman's Fund's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Fireman's Fund repeatedly refers to Big Sky's Memorandum in
Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition in its Brief, but does not
acknowledge that Big Sky argued in its Memorandum in Opposition that this Court should
consider Big Sky's argument on appeal because the circumstances are exceptional. (See Big
3

Sky's Memorandum in Opposition, p. 15.)
Finally, in Fireman's Fund's own Briefs on Appeal, Fireman's Fund admits that Big Sky
filed a Motion for Leave to Amend, and that Fireman's Fund joined in the opposition to the
Motion for Leave to Amend. (See Defendant Fireman's Fund's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Disposition at page 4; Fireman's Fund's Brief at page 7; 20.) If nothing
else, the trial court's decision on Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend has been properly
preserved for appeal with respect to Fireman's Fund.
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING BIG SKY'S MOTION TO AMEND WITH RESPECT
TO FIREMAN'S FUND.
Fireman's Fund argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the trial
court properly considered the Rule 15(a) factors of (1) timeliness of the motion, (2) justification
given by the movant for the delay, and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party. As has
already been argued, the trial court should have used a Rule 15(c) analysis rather than the Rule
15(a) analysis. However, assuming that the trial court should have used a Rule 15(a) analysis,
the trial court's decision was really based on Holmes Dev. L.L.C. v. Cook and its incorrect
application of the statute of limitations, even though the trial court used the words timeliness,
justification for delay, and prejudice.
Moreover, the trial court never made specific findings of fact with respect to why the
Motion to Amend was denied as to Fireman's Fund. This is a per se abuse of discretion. In
Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., this Court acknowledged the well-accepted rule that "it is a
per se abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to explain its decision regarding a motion to
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amend with reference to the appropriate principles of law or the factual circumstances that
necessitate a particular result/' Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, P42 (Utah
Ct. App. 2004). Certainly the denial of Big Sky's Motion to Amend was a per se abuse of
discretion with respect to Fireman's Fund, as there are no specific factual findings of
untimeliness, unjustifiable delay, or prejudice when it comes to Fireman's Fund. (R575-576).
C. BIG SKY'S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AGAINST FIREMAN'S
FUND ARE NOT FUTILE,
Fireman's Fund argues that Big Sky's claims for relief against Fireman's Fund are futile,
and therefore the trial court's denial of Big Sky's Motion to Amend was appropriate. Big Sky's
arguments relating to first party insurer liability as opposed to third party insurer liability are
correct with respect to a claim for bad faith. However, these arguments are irrelevant to the
liability Big Sky would raise were it enabled to pursue its insurer liability claim. The claim that
Big Sky asserts for notice pleading purposes is actually not only contained in Big Sky's proposed
Second Amended Complaint, but also in the Amended Complaint, and that is in the Prayer for
Relief, paragraph 2, where Big Sky asks for relief stating that Fireman's Fund's and Lawyers
Title's are "liable for damages incurred by their insured." Under Section 31A-22-201, Big Sky
can obtain vicarious relief from Fireman's Fund once Big Sky has proved that it has obtained a
specific money judgment against Avis and Archibald, and that execution against Avis and
Archibald is returned unsatisfied. In addition, Fireman's Fund has admitted that Big Sky may
bring a common-law negligence claim against Fireman's Fund. (R382).
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II.

REPLY TO LAWYERS TITLE'S ARGUMENT.
A. BIG SKY'S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST LAWYERS TITLE
AND FIREMAN'S FUND DID NOT EXIST WHEN BIG SKY
COMMENCED THIS LITIGATION.
Lawyers Title cites Dep't of Natural Resources v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.,

2002 Utah LEXIS 102, PI7-20, 52 P.3d 1257, 1264 (Utah 2002), a case cited by Big Sky at
length in Big Sky's brief, purportedly to support the proposition that any statutory cause of action
existed against Lawyers Title in 1997. However, Lawyers Title fails to recite the critical part of
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., which is that "generally the plaintiff must have suffered
damages before a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes." Id. (emphasis
added). Despite the trial court's finding of fact that Big Sky had not suffered any "actual
pecuniary loss . . . at the time of this hearing" (R133-136) Lawyers Title uses a unique but
incorrect argument to try and show that Big Sky had actually suffered a pecuniary loss at the time
that Big Sky filed its original Complaint. Lawyers Title argues, erroneously using language from
Big Sky's brief, that Big Sky had actually suffered damages prior to the filing of Big Sky's
original Complaint in November 1997 because Wayne Ogden paid funds back to Big Sky after
the original Complaint in this action was filed. However, there is nothing in Big Sky's brief or
the record that shows that Wayne Ogden paid funds back to Big Sky after the original Complaint
in this action was filed. Contrary to Lawyers Title's argument, the Complaint filed against
Wayne Ogden was a separate action from the instant action that wasfiledprior to Wayne
Ogden's involuntary bankruptcy filed in June 1997 and the instant action filed in November
1997. Wayne Ogden paid funds back to Big Sky before his involuntary bankruptcy and the
instant action werefiled,which was why the Bankruptcy Court deemed the transfer to Big Sky
6

was a preferential transfer and therefore void. Big Skyfiledthe instant action against Avis &
Archibald and Jayson Cherry because Big Sky anticipated that it might have to repay funds to the
bankruptcy estate.
The fact that is clear in the record before this Court is that the trial court made a finding
of fact on January 10, 2000 that "[t]he judgment entered against [Big Sky] by the Bankruptcy
Court is an outstanding judgment but has not resulted in actual pecuniary loss to [Big Sky] at the
time of this hearing." (R133-136).
Lawyers Title next argues that because Big Sky alleged that Avis & Archibald and Jayson
Cherry mishandled escrow funds in its original Complaint that somehow the causes of action had
properly accrued as to Lawyers Title in 1997. However, this argument also flies in the face of the
trial court's January 10,2000 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which the court found
that Avis & Archibald was liable for damages, but would not give Big Sky any damages amount
against Avis & Archibald because the court found as a matter of fact that Big Sky had not
experienced a pecuniary loss as a result of Avis & Archibald's actions. (R133-136).
Because Big Sky did not suffer any damages until 2002, the claims against Lawyers Title
and Fireman's Fund did not accrue until 2002.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
BIG SKY'S MOTION TO AMEND.
Lawyers Title uses the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Lawyers Title
presented to the trial court for signature, in an effort to argue that the trial court actually made
appropriate timeliness, justification for delay, and prejudice findings and conclusions. However,
these findings and conclusions were not the ones reached by the trial court in oral argument.
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Instead, the trial court's ruling at oral argument was based on the court's incorrect determination
that the applicable causes of action had accrued in 1997 and therefore expired in 2000. (R720,
pp. 22-26). In reality, the causes of action applicable to Lawyers Title did not accrue until 2002,
and one cause of action against Fireman's Fund has still yet to accrue, as Big Sky has not been
able to obtain a judgment against Avis & Archibald that it can then pursue against Fireman's
Fund. The trial court actually found at oral argument that Big Sky had justified its delay in
bringing the Motion to Amend due to the prior ongoing bankruptcy litigation in which Big Sky
had been involved. Finally, the court's finding that Lawyers Title would be prejudiced if Big Sky
were allowed to amend was again based on the court's erroneous conclusion as to the applicable
statute of limitations. The court did make a reference to the potential prejudice that might result
from the time that had passed, but merely made a guess as to whether or not Lawyers Title would
be able to produce witnesses or documents. There is nothing in the record as to any real
prejudice to Lawyers Title other than Lawyers Title's conclusory argument and the court's own
conjecture that if the amendment were allowed, Lawyers Title would somehow be prejudiced.
C. BIG SKY CAN DEMONSTRATE AN IDENTITY OF INTEREST
BETWEEN AVIS & ARCHIBALD AND LAWYERS TITLE AND
FIREMAN'S FUND.
Lawyers Title argues that there is no identity of interest for relation back purposes
between Lawyers Title and Avis & Archibald because the defenses raised by Lawyers Title and
Avis & Archibald are different. In order for Big Sky to prevail against Lawyers Title on its
statutory claim against Lawyers Title, Big Sky would have to show that Avis & Archibald
somehow had liability for the disbursement of funds to Wayne Ogden. Big Sky would then have
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to show that Lawyers Title was liable as a principal for the acts of its agent. Unlike the father
and son in Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157, 71 P.3d 631 (Utah App. 2003), Lawyers Title and
Avis & Archibald do have a sufficient unity of legal interest based on their principal/agent
relationship. Similarly, Fireman's Fund and Avis & Archibald have a sufficient identity of legal
interest as provided for in their insured/surety relationship.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in its interpretation and application of the applicable statute of
limitations and its analysis of whether or not Big Sky's relation back arguments pursuant to Rule
15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure made Big Sky's Motion to Amend appropriate. In the
alternative, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Big Sky's Motion to Amend. Finally,
the trial court erred in granting the Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment, as Big Sky raised
other causes of action in addition to the fraudulent nondisclosure claim that the trial court
dismissed. The Memorandum Decision and Order of the trial court should be vacated, Big Sky
should be allowed to amend its complaint, and the case should be remanded to allow Big Sky to
proceed to trial.
DATED and SIGNED this JQ_ day of February 2006.
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
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